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ABSTRACT 
 
ALBERTO SERRANO: Obstacles Behind A Common European Energy Policy: Case Studies of 
Russia, Germany and Hungary 
(Under the direction of Gary Marks) 
 
This thesis explains the obstacles constraining the development of a coherent Common 
Energy European Policy (CEEP). It hypothesizes that the full implementation of a CEEP has 
been slow because it is not in line with the national energy interests of all European Union (EU) 
member states. The crux of the problem is that the interests of some EU members like Germany 
and Hungary have slowed down the implementation of a common energy policy to get special 
benefits from producers like Russia. 
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SECTION 1 
INTRODUCTION 
  
 
 Skeptics insist that the enactment of a Common European Energy Policy is practically an 
impossible feat. They suggest that it is simply too difficult to integrate the interests of different 
European countries under one voice. They argue that the energy sector is simply too strategic and 
vital for EU member states to entrust to Brussels. Moreover, they insist that even if Europe were 
to enact one, they believe it is too difficult to envision its shape. Finally, they insist that because 
the EU is not a political federation, they are not entitled to give up such vital assets away. 
 As an entity, however, the EU has given up various strategic and vital assets in order to 
“gain the strength and world influence none of them could have on their own”1. The fact that 
European countries, sometimes-former archenemies like Germany and France, have pooled their 
interests means that EU member states want to exert more influence on the larger world2. In fact, 
                                                            
1 European Union Institutions (2007): “Institutions.” Europa.eu. <http://europa.eu/institutions/index_en.htm> 
September 1, 2008. 
2 Ibid EU Institutions (2007). 
equally vital areas such as national currencies, migrant controls and monetary policy have 
already been entrusted to Brussels. Energy policy, therefore, deserves equal attention by EU 
policy makers given the numerous challenges affecting Europe’s energy markets. The events in 
Georgia last August and the cut offs to the Ukraine in 2006 make it imperative for Brussels to 
start envisioning a Common European Energy Policy (CEEP).  
 Although skeptics maintain that a CEEP is an unrealistic policy because European energy 
markets operate better without government intervention, energy companies often go under the 
political umbrella of their respective governments when their interests seem threatened. As 
Geden, Goldthau and Noetzel accurately note, energy companies are the ones taking the most 
important investment decisions3. In addition, awkward and ineffective political meddling can 
hinder the growth of private companies. Thus, it is only reasonable that the companies making 
the bulk of the investments should be the ones making the majority of the decisions.  
 Most European markets, however, operate to a greater or lesser extent under the umbrella 
of their national governments. In other words, responsible government intervention seems 
appropriate in Europe’s energy markets given the uncertain ambitions of energy suppliers to the 
EU like Russia. Furthermore, European governments have lately employed political 
maneuvering to repel unwanted foreign intervention. For instance, when Italy’s Enel wanted to 
takeover France’s Suez, Paris explicitly prevented the acquisition by merging it with GDF.  
 In addition, when Spain’s Endesa wanted to repel Germany’s EON takeover attempt, 
Endesa sought Madrid’s protection despite repeated calls from the Commission for Spain to 
                                                            
3 Geden, Oliver, Andreas Goldthau und Timo Noetzel (2007). “Energie-Nato und Energie-KSZE - Instrumente der 
Versorgungssicherheit? Die Debatte um Energieversorgung und kollektive Sicherheitssysteme“ [transl. Energy Nato 
and Energy OSCE and the Instruments of Supply Security? The Debate on Energy Supply and Collective Security 
System]. Discussion Paper. German Institute for International Affairs.Berlin,May: Pp. 12. 
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approve the merger. Moreover, when Berlin formally entered negotiations with Moscow on the 
North Stream pipeline, Germany’s former chancellor Gerhard Schroeder chaired the consortium 
leading the project. All of which leads to the conclusion that in Europe’s energy market business 
and political interests often intercept. 
 Most importantly, pooling energy sources under one European voice has already taken 
place in Europe. After a devastating World War II, Europeans started the continent’s new course 
precisely by integrating energy capabilities. Even the framework of the EU was based on the 
1951 European Coal and Steel Community. It was under the integrationist ideas of Robert 
Schumann and Jean Monnet that post-war France and Germany were able to unify, or 
Europeanize, their coal and steel assets to ensure peace in Europe. Not only were Germany and 
France the largest competing economies of continental Europe, but they were archenemy states 
that were able to unify their energy capabilities even after three wars.   
 It was precisely through the Monet Method that pooled energy resources to integrate 
Europe’s common economic interests that Paris and Berlin started coining the principles that 
dominated Europe’s foreign policy for the second half of the 20th Century4. In other words, the 
origins of the EU precisely come from European countries pooling their energy capabilities. This 
leads to the conclusion that the strength of the current European Union depends on the EU’s 
energy capabilities. The submissive behavior from Brussels and other European capitals towards 
Russia with the events in Georgia exemplify such conclusion. 
 Finally, when Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Luxembourg and Germany 
established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) of 1952, they were cognizant that 
                                                            
4 Ibid Kraener (2007): Pp. 121 
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Europe needed a common market and an atomic energy community to harmonize post-war 
Europe. Thus, the six founding members subsequently established the European Economic 
Community (EEC). Consequently, the six members formed the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EURATOM) to tackle the general shortage of conventional energy of the 1950’s 
focusing on nuclear energy in order to achieve energy independence. They recognized that the 
costs for investing in nuclear energy capabilities could only be met if individual countries joined 
efforts and expertise, which is very similar to Europe’s current situation5. 
 Currently, the EU’s energy security is low due to its high dependency on Russia, 
Europe’s largest supplier and a country that is lately using energy cut offs (or the threat of one) 
as a foreign policy tool with its neighboring countries in Eastern Europe. Despite being the 
world’s second largest economy, the EU has not devised a common energy policy to tackle such 
risks. This weakness in securing gas and oil supplies, however, makes it imperative for Brussels 
to device a strategy that also strengthens the Union’s energy security. Thus, this thesis revolves 
around the following central question: how can one explain the constraints of developing a 
coherent Common European Energy Policy (CEEP)? To answer this question, the thesis will 
explain energy policy at the European and national level and focus on the cases of European 
consumers such as Germany and Hungary and producers like Russia.  
 The thesis will explain that the crux of the problem remains in the bundled-nature of the 
EU’s internal energy market, which is influenced by a country’s resources, economic situation, 
and energy needs. Specifically, the EU energy market operates under the lead of strong National 
Champions. These champions are difficult to integrate under a common energy policy because 
                                                            
5 Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) (2007): “Objectives.” Europa.eu. 
December 19. <http://europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/euratom_en.htm> August 25, 2008. 
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they act as protectors of the strategic assets of their countries. National champions, in turn, 
perpetuate Europe’s Resource Nationalism, which refers to the way governments keep a 
country’s strategic energy assets exclusively under domestic control.  
 Therefore, this thesis hypothesizes that the most glaring obstacle in implementing a 
CEEP is that common energy policy is not in line with the national interests of all EU member 
states. Notably, the cluttered internal market is slowing the full implementation of a CEEP 
because countries like Italy, Germany, Spain, France, Britain and the Netherlands protect their 
powerful National Champions (a term that describes the energy companies within the European 
countries) to safeguard their strategic energy assets.  
 Russia is also a contending player in terms of the CEEP. Moscow is aggressively seeking 
to solidify its presence in the European markets. Thus, a common European energy policy will 
meet resistance from Russia. Clearly, it is in Russia’s interests to continue being Europe’s most 
important energy provider since the EU’s demand for energy imports will increase from 50% to 
65 % in two decades and Europe remains Russia’s most lucrative market6. Amid these 
circumstances, it is in Russia’s interests to trample any EU-joint effort to unify Europe’s internal 
markets.  
 This explains why Russia is enticing single member states like Germany and Hungary to 
drop out of the EU consensus through the construction of pipeline projects in strategic 
geographic points like the North Sea and the Black Sea so Moscow continues increasing the 
EU’s dependence on Russian energy supplies. Lastly, the Kremlin’s emboldened energy policy is 
the result of Vladimir Putin’s vision of a strong and vociferous Russia whereby energy policy 
                                                            
6 Ibid Energy Commission (2007). 
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serves fundamental political and economic objectives. Consequently, this thesis would illustrate 
the cases of two countries that are challenging the implementation of a common policy.  
 The first is Germany with its North Stream pipeline project stemming from Russia. This 
Russian-Dutch-German project would make Germany a major energy distribution center for 
Europe. Berlin’s move, however, circumvents the EU proposal that supports energy 
diversification away from Russia. The second case is Hungary, which is negotiating the 
extension of the Blue Stream Pipeline in its soil with Russia. By doing so, Hungary is turning its 
back at the EU-backed Nabucco pipeline project, which seeks to reduce the EU’s dependency on 
Russia by importing gas from non-Russian sources in the Caspian Sea region. By allowing Blue 
Stream’s extension in Hungary, Budapest’s stance has endangered Nabucco’s conclusion given 
way for Europe’s growing dependency on Russian gas. 
 Since Russia is Europe’s most important energy supplier, a portion of this work will be 
devoted to Russia. Russia is an integral part of European energy policy because at least in the 
middle run Russia is an essential partner to the EU. Firstly, Russia has a splendid geographical 
comparative advantage in relation to other producers in the Middle East and Africa. Secondly, 
Russia possesses the most important existing energy transportation networks to Europe. Thirdly, 
Russia’s lofty reserves make it an extremely attractive energy supplier not in only in Europe, but 
in Asia as well, where developing economies are desperately searching for energy sources to 
supply their energy-hungry industries.  
 Finally, a slew of global factors have affected energy markets such as drying oil wells, 
America’s credit crisis, political unpredictability in producer States like Iran and Venezuela, 
unforeseeable natural catastrophes like Katrina, high investor speculation due to active terrorist 
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activity and unresolved wars in the Middle East (Iraq). As a result, analysts like Kraener believe 
that the United States, the EU, Russia, China, India and Japan are in a stage where these actors 
are competing for the last sources of oil. For that reason, the following thesis presents the energy 
issue as an indispensible one to assess in order to strengthen the EU’s security.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
SECTION 2 
ENERGY POLICY AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL 
 
2.1 Assessing Energy Security 
 
 Energy security, which depends on physical reserves, price and market structure, is one 
of the major challenges that Europe will confront in the next decades. According to Nicolas 
Lefèvre, possible short-term solutions that decrease the risk of energy supply shortage include 
strategic reserves, coordinated emergency oil stocks, and contingency plans to reduce 
consumption on the side of governments. Long-term solutions, however, seem more complicated 
to enact given the complexities they bring about. For example, the two most important causes of 
energy shortage are the following1: 
    1. Regulatory failures: Governments establish market rules to create effective markets, but are 
unable to ensure market quality.  
                                                 
1 Lefèvre, Nicolas (2007): “Energy Security and Climate Policy: Assessing Interactions.” International Energy 
Agency. Chapter 2: The Nature of Climate Change and Energy Security Policy Interactions. Pp. 32, 34. 
     2. Concentration of energy resources: Fossil fuels’ exploration and production is concentrated 
in certain regions of the planet such as the Middle East and Russia2. 
In regards to regulation, the countries belonging to the Organization of Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) have tried to liberalize their energy markets in the hopes of spurring 
efficiency3.  
 However, as Lefèvre suggests, the shift remains complex due to the lengthiness of firms 
and regulators to learn the process4. For example, Lefèvre notes that England’s and Wales’ 
market was fundamentally changed eleven years after the regulatory policy was launched 
(1990/2001). Moreover, once market structures are liberalized, new challenges arise, such as 
skepticism from national governments to participate in the liberalization efforts. For example, 
although the EU Commission approved the takeover, Spain refused to sell its energy company 
Endesa to Germany’s EON in 2006 and 2007. 
 Another challenge to energy security is the uneven concentration of carbohydrates, which 
Lefèvre described as the most long-lasting cause of energy insecurity5. For example, 62% of the 
world’s oil is in the Middle East6. Furthermore, the Organization for Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) holds 75% of the world’s oil reserves. On the other hand, the heaviest energy 
consumers, namely the OECD counties, hold only 7% of the world’s oil reserves. Not only is this 
                                                 
2 Geden, Oliver, Andreas Goldthau und Timo Noetzel (2007): “Energie-Nato“ und „Energie-KSZE“ - Instrumente 
der Versorgungssicherheit? Die Debatte um Energieversorgung und kollektive Sicherheitssysteme [transl. Energy 
Nato and Energy OECD and the Instruments of Supply Security? The Debate on Energy Supply and Collective 
Security System]. Discussion Paper. German Institute for International Affairs (SWP-Berlin). May. Pp. 8. 
3 Ibid Lefèvre (2007): Pp.34. 
4 Ibid Lefevre (2007): Pp. 35 
5 Ibid Lefèvre (2007) Pp.36 
6 Ibid Lefèvre (2007): Pp. 36 
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visible in the oil sector, but also in the gas market as well. Lefèvre demonstrates that only three 
countries hold half of the world’s proven gas reserves; Russia with 27%, Iran with 15%, and 
Qatar with 14%.  
 Similar to the oil picture, the OECD countries hold only 8% of the world’s gas reserves 
while they consume over half of the world’s total7. Amid these contradictions, the energy market 
is a struggle between swiftly drying supply and ever-growing demand. Lefevre maintains that 
due to the easy access and low costs of extracting oil in the Middle East and North Africa, 
OECD countries have ‘significantly relied on these region’s oil imports8.” That is to say, that 
59% of the OECD’s oil needs were covered through imports; OECD Europe imported 40% of its 
gas needs and OECD Pacific 69%. The OECD countries are in simple words ‘heavily dependent 
importers.’  
 The underlying problem for Lefèvre is that producer countries have extremely sensitive 
political climates. Since 1957, most oil crises including the Six Day War (1967), the Arab-Israeli 
War (1973-1974), the Iranian Revolution (1978-1979), and today’s war in Iraq were politically 
motivated9. Not only have these crises produced significant supply shortages, but they have also 
altered the economic progress of OECD countries. For example, the 1973-1974 OPEC-produced 
shortage altered the stability of the world’s economy. The EU has also witnessed the 
consequences of political instability in the gas sector. In 2006, the Russian-Ukrainian dispute 
over transit fees cut off Western Europe’s gas supplies, which is the main source of energy for 
the majority of European households.  
                                                 
7Ibid Lefèvre (2007): Pp. 36  
8 Ibid Lefèvre (2007): Pp. 36 
9 Ibid Lefèvre (2007): Pp. 37 
 
 
10
 Although it is difficult to speculate about the future, it is certain that as long as the 
OECD’s energy needs are dependent on oil and gas, these producer countries in Africa, Asia and 
the Middle East will continue being of vital importance. The International Energy Agency (IEA), 
the entity that measures future energy trends, estimated in 2006 the world’s remaining reserve-
to-production-ratios (R/P). R/P ratios represent the length of time that those remaining reserves 
would last if production were to continue at that level. These estimates show that the Middle East 
has an R/P of 81 years while the OECD of only 11 years.  
 Even though these ratios are subject to change since reserves are a dynamic quantity due 
to changes in price, technology, and demand, Lefèvre believes that the OECD will more than 
likely increase its reliance on Middle Eastern oil in the near future10. In the gas sector, the 
OECD’s dependency is even more likely because reserves are found in a handful of countries. 
Lefèvre shows that Russia has an R/P of 81 years and both Iran and Qatar of 100 years. The 
OECD, however, has only an R/P of 14 years, which hints that the OECD gas dependency is 
very likely to increase.   
 Consequently, Lefevre suggests that the policy response from the OECD should seek to 
“minimize exposure to concentration risks.” He believes that this is extremely important since 
the unequal concentration of energy supplies is a “long-term driver of energy security.” 
Furthermore, these common policies should seek to diversify the sources of supplier countries, 
trade means and routes11. Finally, Lefevre suggests that in order to curtail these risks, the OECD 
should foster dialogue with producer states. 
                                                 
10 Ibid Lefèvre (2007): Pp. 38 
11 Ibid Lefèvre (2007): Pp. 38 
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 2.2 Challenges for the EU 
 
 One of the biggest challenges the EU Commission faces, however, is that they lack the 
ability to influence the inner market of the EU members in order to pursue more energy-
cooperating policies. Although in environmental protection and monetary policy the EU 
Commission is very powerful in regulating the Members’ strategies, they are extremely weak in 
energy policy. The Commission, nonetheless, has enacted working policies to try to coordinate 
the member’s energy policy. 
 In the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the EU adopted the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP). One of the goals the CFSP was to promote sustainable development12. In addition, one 
of the goals of 2003 EU Security Strategy was that the EU would actively purse common climate 
protection and energy policies. Furthermore, in 2007 the EU adopted “An Energy Policy for 
Europe” seeking to decrease the EU’s import dependency13.  
 The Commission’s source of concern is that the members’ dependency will increase in 
the coming decades. Moreover, the Commission believes that a European energy policy is 
necessary to prevent that the possible energy shortfalls of one member affect others. Since the 
EU will become more dependent on energy imports, the Commission believes that the business-
as-usual approach is no longer sustainable.  
                                                 
12 Müller Kraener, Sascha (2007): Energiesicherheit.“Das Grosse Spiel um die Vermessung der Welt.“   [transl. 
Energy Security. The Great Game that Measures the World]. Antje Kunstmann Publishing House. Pp. 57 
13 European Commission (2007): An Energy Policy for Europe.” Statement from the Commission in the European 
Council and the European Parlament. Brusells, 10. Jan.2007, KOM 2007.  
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 The EU will certainly face critical challenges. The Commission, for example, estimates 
that energy imports, currently 50%, will peak to 65% in the next twenty years. Its gas imports 
will increase 33% (to 84% from 57%) and oil imports 11% (to 93% from 82%) in this period14. 
Another source of concern is that the world’s energy resources are under pressure. The 2006 
World Energy Outlook, which gives thoughtful insights into the future of the energy markets, 
believes that there are new players exerting pressure in the competition to secure their own 
sources of energy, notably India and China. These two countries, in addition to having the 
world’s populations, have reached notable economic growth at the turn of this century. This 
growth, however, has not reached the entirety of its population.  
 This is why Joachim Bitterlich believes that the OECD and the emerging economies of 
India and China will engage themselves in a ‘supply war15.’ Presently, the EU consumes 17% of 
the world’s energy, the United States 29% and Asia 20%. However, just India consumes 4% and 
China 11%. The source of alarm, however, lies in the new entrants. Since China and India have 
not fully developed their economies, there are still low-income sectors of their populations that 
are not energy consumers.   
 China’s per capita consumption exemplifies this. China’s population consumes on 
average 17% more energy per person than that of the US and 29% more than Europe16. China is 
currently growing between eight to ten percent a year. For Bitterlich, therefore, the most 
important question is, what will the energy situation look like for China in the next 10 years, 
when more consumers come into the energy market? Although one ignores how the energy 
                                                 
14 Ibid Energy Commission (2007). 
15 Bitterlich, Joachim (2006): “The Future of the EU’s Energy Policy: Do We Need a European High Authority for 
Energy?” European View. November. Volume 4. Pp. 24 
16 Ibid Bitterlich (2006): Pp. 24. 
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market will look like in 10 years, it is likely that energy demand will continue to increase given 
that these energy-hungry countries are net energy importers. It is worthwhile to mention that the 
food prices have already increased because of the growing demand in China and India. 
   Thus, there are great political and economic risks to be taken into account, if an energy 
supply war comes to being. The International Energy Agency’s 2007 Energy Outlook estimates 
that if the governments of the world continue espousing the current energy policies in place, the 
world’s energy needs will increase by 50% in 205017.  For all of the above, it seems urgent that 
the EU actively pursues a Common Energy European Policy (CEEP) so that the EU members do 
not engage in a supply war among themselves, which might in turn considerably erode the 
European integration links. 
 
2.3 Russia: Understanding the EU’s Most Important Energy Producer 
 
“The more other countries are nervous about their energy security, the better Russia is geopolitically.”  
-Peter Halloran, CEO of Moscow-based Pharos Financial Group18. 
 
 Dialogue with Russia is an essential component for the successful implementation of a 
common energy policy. Russia is for many reasons the EU’s most important neighbor. Firstly, 
Russia is in many ways one of the world’s most important energy suppliers due to its gigantic 
energy potential. Secondly, Russia will possibly remain Europe’s most important source of 
energy in the future. Often considered an energy superpower, Russia holds about 26.6% of the 
                                                 
17 International Energy Agency (2007): World Energy Outlook 2007, Executive Summary, Paris. 
18 Romero, Simon, Michael Slackman and Clifford Levy (2008): “3 Oil Rich Countries Face a Reckoning.” The New 
York Times. October 20, 2008. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/21/world/21petro.html?pagewanted=3&_r=1&hp> October, 21, 2008. 
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world’s gas and 6.2% of its oil reserves. In other words, Russia has enough gas for 80 years and 
oil for 21 years. Moreover, Russia holds comparative advantage as supplier in relation to other 
energy suppliers due to its massive territory, which extends itself from Europe, throughout Asia 
until it borders the American continent at the Bearing Strait. Finally, one of Russia’s major 
strengths is its low prices in relation to other producers. This is specially true for Europe. 
 Russian producers have lower costs due to its extensive pipeline system that covers most 
of Europe, unlike other producers in the Middle East and Africa, which have to ship their oil to 
Europe19. For Götz, as long as Middle Eastern and African producers ship their oil, Europeans 
will continue favoring Russian imports since these remain more cost efficient. Therefore, 
Russia’s lofty energy reserves and comparative advantage in logistics posits Russia as one of the 
EU’s fundamental partners.   
 
2.3.1 The Origins of European Mistrust: The Ukrainian-Russian Dispute 
  
 In 2006, Moscow cut-off supplies to the Ukraine, making European capitals nervous that 
Russia would use energy supplies as an intimidation instrument of their foreign policy. Some 
suggested that behind the dispute was a Kremlin warning to Kiev for warming itself too much to 
Brussels and Washington. The case, moreover, exemplifies the difficulties that countries face 
when they have few energy suppliers.  
                                                 
19 Götz, Roland (2007): Russland als Energiepartner Deutschlands: Business Guide Deutschland Russland 2008,  
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 On one hand, those countries belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States, 
namely the Eastern European countries controlled by the Soviet Union, receive subsidized oil 
prices. Furthermore, the countries that serve as transit countries for Russian pipelines receive 
lucrative energy fees. The Ukraine, however, owed $1.3 billion to the Russian energy company 
Gazprom20. This certainly strained Kiev’s position vis-à-vis Moscow.  
Since earlier this decade, the Ukrainian-Russian relationship has been icy. A series of 
incidents including the Orange Revolution, in which Ukrainians demonstrated against the 
Russian-backed Presidential candidate that rigged the elections, have dampened the Kiev-
Moscow relationship. Furthermore, when Kiev applied for a membership to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), an entity created during the Cold War to contain the Soviet 
influence, Moscow became weary.   
Moreover, the Ukraine possesses few energy supply alternatives, which makes it prone to 
price manipulations, given that Russia is the country’s single-most important energy supplier. 
From the Ukrainian-Russian dispute, one learns that Europeans should aim at a diversification of 
their energy suppliers. This is a classic case of a market being dependent on a single supplier, 
which enables the supplier to manipulate freely prices and supply. The Ukraine is not alone. 
Several EU countries are dependent on Russian energy. Der Spiegel estimates that the Russian 
gas behemoth Gazprom is a supplier to about 30 European countries. Estonia and Slovakia, for 
example, depend 100% on Gazprom, Greece 80%, Hungary 84%, Poland 60% and Germany 
36% respectively21. This makes Russians extremely powerful when dealing with the EU. The 
                                                 
20 Goldthau, Andreas (2008): “Resurgent Russia: Rethinking Energy Inc.” Hoover Institution. 
<http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/14931716.html> 1. Juli, 2008. 
21 Follath, Eric and Matthias Schepp (2007): Der Konzern des Zaren. [transl. The Concern of the Czars]. Der Spiegel 
10/2008. Pp. 124 
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latest Russian-Georgian conflict illustrates this, whereby most European capitals were unable to 
pressure Moscow to leave Georgia in the aftermath of Russia’s crushing offensive. Furthermore, 
the conflict evidenced how most Europeans countries could not criticize Russia, Europe’s main 
energy provider.   
 Russia’s current hawkish behavior, nonetheless, is understandable. When Russia’s 
economy fumbled in the early 1990’s, the country’s GDP catastrophically fell 60%22. The former 
superpower’s decline in the 1990’s brought social instability, anemic economic growth, the 
collapse of the rubble (Russia’s currency) and widespread discontent. The collapse of Soviet 
Union and its humiliating effects in Russian society, analysts suggest, left Russia yearning for 
stability and its past superpower glory. Debilitating processes in Russia such as the corrupt 
privatization of its energy assets deeply resented even Russia’s most staunch transatlanticists. 
The sour taste of these events left Moscow thirsty for power, which became accustomed to be  
the world’s most belligerent capital with Washington DC after 1945. 
 
 
2.4 Russia: Understanding the Energy Giant 
 
 Vladimir Putin’s Presidency meant the end to an ailing Russian economy. In addition to 
Putin’s strong and efficient handling of the country’s internal politics and finances, earlier this 
decade Russia started enjoying unseen levels of prosperity largely due to strong domestic 
                                                 
22 Kolotov, Vladimir (2008). “Main Trends of Russia’s Foreign Policy in Transforming East and Southeast Asia.” 
Brookings Institution. April. <http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/04_asia_kolotov.aspx> August 9, 2008. 
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consumption and spiking energy prices. As crude prices soared, Russia paid off its international 
debt by 2006, such as the $19.8 billion they owed the International Monetary Fund (IMF)23.   
 Ever growing energy demand has unquestionably allowed Russia to augment its 
confidence in the international stage. Some pundits suggest that it is precisely Russia’s continued 
economic growth what legitimizes Putin’s continuity at the Kremlin despite the country’s 
questionable democratic development24. Simply put, Putin’s popularity depends on the overall 
health of Russia’s economy. This might explain why is it so important for Putin to renationalize 
Russia’s gas and oil fields and bring the windfall of energy exports to State coffers. 
  Russia’s economic backbone is its energy revenues. Energy exports account for about 20 
percent of the Russian economy, 55 percent of their export earnings and 40 percent of their tax 
revenue25. The IMF and the World Bank estimates that each dollar spike in the price of oil 
increases the Russian GDP by 0.35 percent26. Moreover, Russia’s renewed success did not occur 
by accident.  
 As Putin earned his PhD from the St. Petersburg Mining Institute, his thesis explained 
how Russia’s energy resources were crucial to restore the country’s might. Explaining that the 
massive state privatizations during the 1990’s were a mistake, Putin’s thesis calls for a 
renationalization of Russia’s hydrocarbons and the creation of large state vertically-integrated 
                                                 
23 Szrom, Charlie and Thomas Brugatto (2008): “Liquid Courage.” The American. Feb. 22, 2008. 
<http://www.american.com/archive/2008/february-02-08/liquid-courage> August 9, 2008. 
24 White, Gregory (2008): “Oil’s Drag on Russian Growth Poses Test for Putin.” The Wall Street Journal. October 
18, 2008 <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122428427371546367.html> October, 19, 2008. 
25 Nain, Moises (2004): “Russia’s Oily Future.” Forein Policy. January-February, 2004. 
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=2435> August 9, 2004. 
26 Ibid Szrom and Brugatto (2008). 
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companies able to compete on global markets27. Russia’s gas titan Gazprom epitomizes Putin’s 
emboldened energy vision. 
 With a market capitalization of $348 billion, Gazprom represents 8 percent of the Russian 
GDP28. It pays taxes equal to 20% of the Russian budget. Gazprom is the world’s third largest 
company by market value and the Russian State is its major stakeholder. It is poised to become 
the world’s market-juggernaut because it controls 17% of the world’s gas, which is believed to 
be the future’s most important energy resource. As oil world reserves (as a percentage of known) 
dry up, the world’s demand for gas, a more abundant and greener energy source, will increase by 
67% until 2030.  
 Analysts believe “Gazprom’s extensive natural gas reserves may allow it to overtake 
Exxon Mobil’s throne as the world’s largest energy company,” a goal espoused by Dmitry 
Medvedev, Russia’s current president and former Gazprom executive29. Russian supply cut offs 
to neighbors accomplishes two mutually enforcing goals for Gazprom and the Kremlin: Cut offs 
(1) bolster Gazprom’s revenues and (2) reminds Russia’s neighbors (including Western 
Europeans) of its economic and foreign policy power30. Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov 
said in relation to this, “it would be right to say that we view our role in global energy supply as 
means for ensuring our foreign policy independence”31. Although Putin explicitly denies that 
                                                 
27 Wells, Paul (2007): “Vladimir Putin Will Try Anything To Rebuild His Nation’s Global Clout: G8 Tough Guy.” 
Macleans.  June 25. <http://www.macleans.ca/world/global/article.jsp?content=20070625_106293_106293> August 
9, 2008. 
28 Follath, Eric and Matthias Schepp (2007): Der Konzern des Zaren. [transl. The Concern of the Czars]. Der Spiegel 
10/2008. Pp. 2007 
29 Kramer, Andrew (2008): “As Gazprom Goes, So Does Russia.” The New York Times. May 11, 2008 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/11/business/worldbusiness/11gaz.html?pagewanted=1&_r=> August 10, 2008 
30 Ibid Kramer (2008) 
31 Ibid Szrom and Brugatto (2008). 
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energy has been a political tool, a series of events implicitly evidence the opposite, such as the 
supply cuts to Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia earlier this decade. These cuts intended to reassert 
the Kremlin’s influence over its former Soviet sphere of influence.  
 Some analysts suggest that Russia is not in the position to threat its western European 
partners in the same manner. The thesis that Europe has an asymmetrical dependence, which 
states that Western Europe is asymmetrically dependent on Russian energy, is arguable. On one 
hand, energy decisions are market-driven. On the other hand, Russia’s energy exports are the 
main engine of its economy.  As Roland Götz suggests, Moscow cannot hit their western 
partners in the knees because they would hurt themselves32. 
 President Medvedev, Gazprom’s former Chairman, believes that Gazprom could become 
the world’s largest company by market value if it starts raising domestic prices33. Russia’s rock-
bottom domestic prices induce wasteful practices and shrink profits. As a result, Gazprom 
generates the bulk of its revenue in Western Europe34.  Thus, to becoming number one, Gazprom 
faces serious challenges ahead. Only 25% of its total production reaches Western Europe. In 
addition, Russia has subsidized its former Soviet neighbors for 15 years. Meanwhile, Russians 
only pay 17% of what EU-12 pay for gas prices in 2006, a consumption pattern that fosters 
wasteful consumption. For instance, Russia uses 3.2 times more energy per unit of GDP then the 
EU-25.  
                                                 
32 Ibid Götz (2008): Russia as… 
33 Ibid Kramer (2008) 
34 Goldthau, Andreas (2008): “Resurgent Russia: Rethinking Energy Inc.” Hoover Institution. 
<http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/14931716.html> 1. Juli, 2008.  
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 Furthermore, Russia’s energy infrastructure remains heavily underinvested. For example, 
the Yamburg, Urengoy and Medvezh’ye fields, which account for 60 percent of Russia’s total 
production, are drying up, spurring the need for exploration and investment in new projects35. 
Most of these projects, however, are in the far Arctic, which due to climatic and geographical 
challenges have dramatically boosted costs. Just the Russian gas sector plans to spend $17 billion 
a year until 2030 in exploration and production (E&P) projects and mending the current fields to 
meet domestic and external demand36.  
 Additionally, the IEA forecasts that Russia will need $400 billion to cover its future oil 
E&P costs. Thus, Russian energy producers cannot afford to cut off consumption as suggested by 
skeptics. Specifically, the Western European market is too lucrative for Russians to be scrappy 
dealers. Furthermore, Putin’s renationalization strategy restricting foreign investment in the 
energy sector hinders foreign investment in new E&P projects in an already underinvested 
Russian energy infrastructure.   
 Putin’s re-nationalization of energy companies is his attempt to revamp revenues for the 
State coffers and bolster its voice in the world stage. In 2006, for example Shell ceded Gazprom 
the Sakhalin-2 fields37. That same year, Gazprom snagged a bid for the Shtokman gas field, the 
world’s third largest, in a competition with the foreign companies of Chevron, Statoil, and 
Total38. As of early August of 2008, a 50-50 Russian-British joint venture of TNK-BP is facing 
shareholder disputes, which suggests that the venture will not succeed further in its current form. 
                                                 
35 Ibid. Goldthau (2008) 
36 Ibid. Golthau (2008) 
37 Hooper, Simon (2006): “Russia: A Superpower Rises Again.” CNN. December 13. 
<http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/12/12/russia.oil/index.html?iref=newssearch> August 11, 2008. 
38 Ibid Hooper (2006). 
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Although TBK-BP is the “only oil company with partial foreign control, TNK-BP may be 
excluded from developing new fields under national security rules39.”  
 Putin’s nationalistic energy policy is not entirely uncommon in the EU as well. Although 
Western European energy conglomerates are not State-run companies, they are “National 
Champions.” When the Spain’s Jose Luis R. Zapatero government shrewdly prevented an 
acquisition by Germany’s EON in 2006, Madrid was worried about its national energy resources 
in the hands of foreigners. Enel, Italy’s conglomerate, followed suit by trying to take over Suez, 
a Franco-Belgian conglomerate that same year. Paris, however, cunningly protected Suez by 
merging it with GDF, the French State gas monopoly, five days later.  The problem with these 
resource nationalism tendencies, however, is that altercations between two States might affect 
third parties. The cut offs from Russia to Belarus and Ukraine, for instance, evidence how such 
politically charged actions affected third parties in Western Europe. 
 
 
2.4.1 The Georgian-Russian War: Cutting Europe’s Silk Road 
 
 Early this August, the former Soviet republic of Georgia invaded two of its separatist 
territories, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. After the fall of the Soviet Union, these territories 
belonged to Georgia. These two provinces, however, had been struggling for independence from 
Georgia. Russia, moreover, supports the sovereignty of these provinces. Some of its citizens 
even possess Russian passports and their leadership has built an alliance with Russia.  
                                                 
39 Kramer, Andrew (2008): “Reference Material on TNK-BP.” The New York Times. 
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/t/tnk_bp/index.html?inline=nyt-org> August 11, 
2008. 
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 As a result, Georgia’s surprise attack deeply angered Russia. Moscow responded by 
sending a full-armed attack to defend South Ossetia and Abkhazia. After six days of fighting, 
Russia’s military crushed Georgia’s troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and then penetrated 
deep into Georgian soil to seize its Black Sea port of Poti and the country’s main transportation 
routes. Georgia, as a result, surrendered and asked Moscow for a cease-fire. Nevertheless, even 
after western leaders including George Bush and Nicolas Sarkozy called for a reestablishment of 
Georgia’s territorial integrity, Moscow refused to pull out its troops. 
 The Georgian-Russian relationship provides insights into the dense politics of Europe. 
Under Mikhail Saakashivili’s Presidency, Georgia became a staunch US ally trying anxiously to 
become a NATO member. Georgia and the Ukraine even applied to enter the alliance in the last 
NATO meeting in Bucarest, but met resistance by some of its members. Members such as 
Germany refused their accession possibly fearing a downturn in Berlin’s strategic relationship 
with Moscow. Moreover, Saakashivili’s salty rhetoric towards Russia alienated him in 
Muscovite political circles. He has conspicuously criticized Vladimir Putin’s government in 
ways that no other former Soviet country has. Now, with the invasion Russia sees itself as taking 
its rightful place as a leader in Eastern Europe.  
 After Georgia was defeated, Brussels was powerless to restore Georgia’s territorial 
integrity due to deep divisions within the EU on whether or not to pressure Russia. Marc 
Champion et al. summarizes the conflict in the following way:     
 The EU pledged to help Georgia recover from Russia's continuing military intervention, but fears over 
 Europe's dependence on Russia for energy and of splitting the EU prevented moves to pressure Moscow40. 
                                                 
40 Champion, Marc, John W. Miller, David Gauthier-Villars and Alessandra Galloni (2008): “EU Leaders Put Off 
Moves to Pressure Moscow”  The Wall Street Journal Europe. September 2, 2008. 
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122030065989587975.html> September 4, 2008. 
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Given that Russia supplies one fourth of Europe’s gas needs, it is not surprising that some 
countries remain weary about criticizing the Kremlin. The EU’s decision not to pressure Moscow 
until the EU-Summit takes place in November of 2008 evidences Brussels’ divisions on the 
matter.  
 For France’s Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, it is unquestionable that Brussels’ 
restrain “represents energy, gas and oil41.” Although EU members like Poland see Russia’s 
presence in Georgia as an ‘immediate threat’, Kouchner believes that due to the EU’s reliance on 
Russian crude it was unrealistic for the EU to “adopt a confrontational approach towards 
Russia42.” Such divisions, however, should be a wake up call for European policy-makers. The 
fact that Russia can exercise its muscle freely in the Caucus can undermine the stability of an 
extremely important region for the EU’s energy ambitions.  
Russia’s insistence to remain in Georgia kills the Nabucco project43. By doing so, Dan 
Fisher believes Russia is placing a lid in a vital transit country for oil and natural gas for western 
companies like Britain’s BP, which is competing with Russian energy companies to win 
extraction contracts in the Caspian Sea region. Furthermore, Georgian territory is extremely 
important to break away Russia’s monopoly over the rich oil and gas resources of the Caspian 
Sea region. 
                                                 
41 Ibid Champion, Marc, John W. Miller, David Gauthier-Villars and Alessandra Galloni (2008). 
42 Ibid Champion, Marc, John W. Miller, David Gauthier-Villars and Alessandra Galloni (2008). 
43 Fisher, Dan (2008): “Georgia On Our Minds.” Forbes. August 13, 2008. 
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Russia’s next move is to lure Azerbaijan to sell its gas to Gazprom44. By buying 
Azerbaijan’s gas, Heidi Brown argues that Russia would achieve three things. It would (1) gain a 
larger share of Europe’s gas market, (2) increase its pricing power, and (3) immobilize its two 
rival western pipelines, BTC and Baku-Sipsa, which already run through Georgia45. Therefore, 
Russia’s control of Georgia is extremely important for them to monopolize Europe’s energy 
capabilities. 
On the other, when dealing with Russia, Washington and Brussels are caught. Most EU 
members dependent on Russian gas (including Germany) have avoided grievances with the 
Kremlin. Germany, which sees itself as Russia’s most important European trading partner, 
refuses to endanger its strategic alliance with Moscow over third party disputes. They avoided 
uttering the harsh criticism that other EU members like Poland and the Baltic States made to the 
Kremlin. The White House, on the other hand, needs the Kremlin’s help in its war against 
terrorism and halting Iran’s nuclear projects. Ultimately, this suggests that Russia’s emboldened 
energy strategy and cunning alliances are proving effective in curtailing the EU’s diversification 
efforts.   
 
2.5 The Baku-Tiflis-Ceyhan Pipeline 
 
 The Baku-Tiflis-Ceyhan Pipeline (BTC) carries oil from the Caspian Sea port of Baku, 
Azerbaijan through Georgia up to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, Turkey46. BTC was 
                                                 
44 Brown, Heidi (2008): “Gas Master.” Forbes. August 19. <http://www.forbes.com/2008/08/19/gazprom-
azerbaijan-georgia-markets-emerge-cz_hb_0819markets20_print.html> September 3, 2008. 
45 Ibid Brown (2008). 
46 Ibid Kraener (2007): Pp. 136. 
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 constructed to elude Russia, Iran and Armenia. Kraener describes the Caspian Sea as an oil rich 
region since antiquity. For instance, since the times of ancient Greece, Baku was famous for the 
oil that rose up to the surface. In the 19th Century, oil magnate families like the Rockefeller and 
the Rothschild invested in the region47. Therefore, Kraener calls the southern Caucus a “vital 
energy point for international relations48.” 
Although Azerbaijan, Armenia and Azerbaijan are participants of the European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP), Brussels had practically forgotten this region until the Russian-
Georgian conflict erupted49. The United States recognized this region’s potential as energy 
runway immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union due to Azerbaijan’s oil and gas reserves. 
BTC’s construction, though actually initiated by the US, it was mostly funded by Britain’s BP50. 
 BTC was beneficial for the EU, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the US. With BTC, the EU 
decreased its oil dependence from Russia, which greatly pleased Washington DC. Azerbaijan 
had a market for its oil exports. Georgia, in turn, profits from the transit fees51. Kazakhstan, in 
addition, had expressed interest in exporting its oil through BTC. For Russia, however, BTC 
represented a loss in its near oil monopoly in the region52.  
 Russia wants to continue monopolizing the gas market of Armenia and Georgia. In the 
2005 winter, for example, sabotaged the pipelines going to those countries were greatly affected 
                                                 
47 Ibid Kraener (2007): Pp. 137. 
48 Ibid Kraener (2007): Pp.139. 
49 Ibid Kraener (2007): Pp.139 
50 Ibid Kraener (2007): Pp. 139. 
51 Ibid Kraener (2007): Pp. 139-140. 
52 Ibid Kraener (2007): Pp. 140. 
 
 
26
those countries’ heating infrastructure and industries53. As a result, Russia’s presence military 
presence in Georgia effectively sabotages the alternative runway that BTC provided the EU in 
regards to oil supplies. This in turn, increases Russia’s control of hydrocarbons in the region and 
threatens to kill Nabucco.   
 
 
2.6 European Commission’s Strategy  
 
  The EU Commission is the organ in charge of drafting proposals for new European laws, 
which it presents to the EU Parliament and Council54. The Commission has 27 Commissioners, 
or one per EU member. The Commissioners are regarded as officials acting on the benefit of EU 
interests as whole that disregard the national interests of their respective States. Andris Pielbags 
is the Energy Commissioner since 2004. Under Pielbags’ leadership, the Commission proposed 
to the Council an Energy Policy for Europe (EPE). 
 The EPE’s goal is to make the EU a low consumption economy based on a more secure, 
more competitive and more sustainable energy policy, where members worked together to tackle 
the challenge as opposed to single-member strategies55. The EPE was endorsed by the Council in 
March of 2007. It focuses on seven priorities: (1) achieving a true internal market, (2) increasing 
energy efficiency and (3) renewable energy, (4) augmenting investments in technology and (5) 
the prospects of safe nuclear energy, (6) raising energy solidarity among members, and (7) 
                                                 
53 Ibid Kraener (2007): Pp. 140. 
54 European Union Institutions and Other Bodies (2008):  “The European Commission.” Europa.eu 
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developing external energy policy relations56. Finally, the EPE strives to “ensure efficiency and 
coherence” by implementing a common international energy policy so that the EU Member 
states are able to speak with a single voice on energy matters57. Pielbags maintains that market 
liberalization is driving force of the EPE.  
 By breaking national borders and eventually creating a single-market for 480 million 
users, Pielbags intends to increase competition to benefit consumers with freedom of choice and 
open new energy investment opportunities for energy companies58. Pielbags believes that the 
current rules companies controlling the energy market make it difficult for new entrants to use 
their pipelines or high-tension cables, thereby hampering competition and liberalization. With 
the unbundling of these rules, the EPE expects to open up these markets to these new entrants. 
Pielbags concludes that there are still significant barriers in order to unbundle the internal 
market, achieve a competitive and interconnected market, and implement a common 
international energy market to speak on a single voice on energy issues. 
 
2.6 Challenges to an Energy Policy for Europe  
 
 Significant barriers to unify energy interests at the European level include resource 
nationalism and national champions. The barriers date back to the time when European 
                                                 
56 Pielbags, Andris (2008): “My Responsibilities. An Energy Policy for Europe.” European Commission. Feburary 
2. <http://europa.eu/commission_barroso/pielbags/responsabilities_en.htm>  August 17, 2008. 
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governments created National Champions to safeguard their energy assets59. In its origins, 
National Champions were state-run energy companies that were an essential part of the 
government’s national interests.  
 Moreover, the internal markets of the EU Members are difficult to homogenize due to the 
country’s different energy assets. For example, Kraener explains how the state-owned French 
concern Electricité de France (EDF) specialized in nuclear energy during Charles De Gaulle’s 
presidency because the country had little coal reserves. The sources of Polish electricity and 
heating power, furthermore, come considerably from coal while the Czech Republic mostly 
works with brown coal.  
 For Kraener, there are also extremely different approaches in relation to energy such as 
the ones related to geographical location. Baltic States, which depend almost entirely from 
Russian imports, are searching for energy alternatives that circumvent Moscow while Germany 
and the Netherlands are strengthening their partnership with Russia60.  Britain, on the other hand, 
blocked the acquisition of its Gas concern Centrica by Russian investors. Kraener explains that 
Britain can afford to block Russian imports because the bulk of their gas imports come from 
northern Africa and the North Sea. Similarly, Spain’s geographic location allows it to import 
energy from northern Africa and remain less concerned with Russian-European relations61.   
 Another obstacle to achieve an energy policy for Europe is the competitive character of 
the EU, Kraener explains. Since the existing monopolies zones have been gradually abolished, 
European energy companies, private or state-owned, are forced to compete with each other. 
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Therefore, members like Italy, Germany and France built their former state-owned companies as 
National Champions using an Offensive-Defensive strategy.62 They act on the offensive because 
they seek to takeover other National Champions when they can and on the defensive when 
another company seeks to take over them.       
 Kraener mentions how National Champions become defensive by refusing to lend out 
their physical infrastructure to foreign companies or preying unwanted takeovers through 
legislative tricks63. For example, it is practically impossible to compete with National 
Champions like EDF in France and EON and RWE in Germany. France’s EDF owns practic
all the country’s power supply networks. Thus, foreign suppliers wanting compete in their 
internal market can only do so in the periphery of France. In Germany, EON and RWE, whic
were formed by the mergers of a series of companies with formerly state-owned companies, h
practically maintained their monopoly zones intact. Foreign companies like Sweden’s Vatenfall 
managed to enter the German market, but only after making some political concessions and 
deliberately choosing to operate in Eastern Germany, where the monopoly zones were less 
solidified.  
ally 
h 
ave 
                                                
 Even inside the EU, Kraener explains how mistrust still prevails. Although the 
Commission approved the takeover, Spain rejected the acquisition of Endesa by Germany’s titan 
EON through legislative tricks in 2006. First, Madrid attempted to merge Endesa with its 
domestic competitor, Gas Natural. EON responded by offering a higher bid then Gas Natural. 
Spain, nonetheless, rejected this second offer even when EON incessantly tried to lure Endesa’s 
 
62 Ibid Kraener (2007) Pp. 122. 
63 Ibid Kraener (2007) Pp. 123. 
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shareholders with more attractive bids. In the end, Spain merged did not take the offer despite the 
repeated calls from the Commission to allow the EON takeover. 
  Kraener explains how EON was also formed by defensive practices on the side of 
Germany. EON acquired Ruhrgas even when Germany’s cartel authorities recommended 
preventing the takeover. Germany’s Economics Ministry, however, supported EON’s move. This 
defensive strategy evidences how Germany’s government explicitly strengthened EON to 
solidify its presence abroad. In addition, Spain’s protection of Endesa and Germany’s offensive 
move with the EON-Ruhrgas merger evidence how that the powerless the Commission is to 
prevent the protectionism of EU member states in the energy market64. 
 The EU is mostly dominated by the German giants EON, RWE, and ENBW, France’s 
EDF and its gas company Suez and the Italian company ENEL. Rather than operating in a 
peaceful coexistence, these companies see themselves as competitors fighting to expand their EU 
market share to increase profits65. In short, these European energy companies see their own 
survival intrinsically related to the strength of their balance sheets by increasing the number of 
customers, which means they have will eventually have to fight themselves in the process.  
 As a result, it is unlikely for them to cooperate with other European companies. For 
instance, when Italy’s ENEL wanted to acquire France’s Suez in 2006, Paris cunningly 
prevented the acquisition by merging Suez with Gas de France (GDF) five days later. Hence, any 
EU Commission effort to integrate the energy market under an EU umbrella is very difficult to 
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achieve since national governments are firmly maintaining the monopoly zones intact for their 
National Champions. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
SECTION 3 
ENERGY POLICY AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
 
3.1 German Case  
 
 Although Germany is one of the founding members of the EU and its foreign policy is 
pro-European, in the realm of energy it has pursued different interests. Enno Harks and Andreas 
Pointvogl believe that German energy policy is more pragmatic than its pro-EU foreign policy 
suggests1. This is probably because Germany is in a tight position regarding energy needs. 
Although they are one of Europe’s major players due to the size of their economy, they are not 
on par with other major western European countries in the energy sector. Europe’s major players 
of the Great Game (the Rudyard Kipling-coined term to describe the fierce competition for 
energy supplies since turn of the 20th Century) are France, Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
Spain2.  
 The governments of the major European players, Harks and Pointvogl insist, are vying to 
protect their respective oil and gas producers and to maintain their State influence to make 
                                                            
1 Harks, Enno and Andreas Pointvogl (2007): Deutschlands Energieversorgungssicheit im Schatten europäischer 
Energiemärkte [transl. Germany’s Energy Supply in the Shadow of the European Energy Market]. German Institute 
for International and Security Affairs. Berlin. Discussion Paper FG 8/ Nr. 5 April. Pp. 2. 
2 Ibid Harks and Pointvogl (2007): Pp. 3. 
provisions for their nation’s future energy supply and consequently perpetuate their companies’ 
stronghold abroad. As Harks and Pointvogl explain, Germany is for historical reasons the only 
major European economy without an oil or gas company with significant extraction and access 
capabilities abroad3. Since Germany is not a major player in terms of production and access to 
gas and oil reserves overseas, it is highly susceptible to the function of the market, Harks and 
Pointvogl conclude. This makes Germany essentially more dependent on market allocation then 
other major European economies, which can allocate supplies based on national needs because of 
their considerable foreign extraction capabilities.  
 In addition, not all States follow the Commission’s regulations. When Germany’s EON 
attempted to acquire Spain’s Endesa in 2006, Spain repeatedly defied the Commission’s requests 
for Spain to lift up its obstructions to EON’s bid4. Although EU regulators approved the deal, 
Spain has been flagrantly protectionist of its energy assets and an illustrative example of how EU 
governments resist the Commission’s proposals. To brush off EON’s 18-month standing offer, 
Spain ultimately resolved in April of 2007 Endesa’s future by favoring the bid from Acciona, a 
Spanish construction company, and Enel, Italy’s strongest energy company.  
 This made EON’s takeover impossible and even left lingering questions regarding the 
validity of Enel and Acciona’s bid. Spain’s top stock market regulator Manuel Conthe resigned 
immediately after Enel’s offer citing that their last minute bids broke the rules of Spain’s stock 
                                                            
3 Ibid Harks and Pointvogl (2007): Pp. 3. 
4 EU Hopeful Spain to Back Down in EON-Endesa Standoff (2007): EU Business. Brussels, April 2. 
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market5. Lastly, the deal shows how Madrid shied away through tricks for 18 months from 
Germany’s EON bid only to let Italy’s Enel carve up Endesa in a last minute proposal.  
 Harks and Pointvogl suggest that it was in Italy’s interests to water down the takeover 
because the deal would give EON control over Endesa’s Italian subsidiary company Endesa 
Italia, Italy’s third largest electricity company. After Europe saw active attempts for mergers and 
acquisitions in 2006, the governments of Spain (Endesa’s takeover by EON), France (Suez’s take 
over by Enel), Italy (Enel’s marriage with Endesa) and Germany (EON’s unsuccessful Endesa 
bid) have enacted a slew of barriers to brush off unwanted takeovers.  According to Harks and 
Pointvogl, these governments are enacting such laws to protect their National Champions, which 
ultimately erodes any effort from the Commission to pass a common energy policy. 
 Even though Germany has two of the largest energy companies in Europe, EON and 
RWE, they are net importers of gas. German companies such as Wintershall (a subsidiary from 
BASF), Wingas, and EON Ruhrgas produce gas and oil, but their influence in the international 
energy market is minimal6. For instance, in 2005 RWE produced 2.4 billion cubic meters of gas 
per year and Wintershall 7.4 billion barrels while France’s Total produced 49.6 billion barrels 
and Britain’s BP 87,5 billion barrels7. In oil, the picture does not change for Germany. While 
RWE and Wintershall are producing 0.08 and 0.18 million barrels of oil per day respectively, 
Total is producing 1.62 and million barrels and BP 2.60. 
                                                            
5 Burnett, Victoria (2007): “German Suitor Makes Deal With Rival and Its Bid for Endesa, a Spanish Utility.” The 
New York Times. April 3, 2007 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/03/business/worldbusiness/03energy.html?scp=1&sq=Endesa%20Eon%20Italy
&st=cse> August 29, 2008. 
6 Ibid Harks and Pointvogl (2007): Pp.5. 
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 3.1.2 Making for the Pitfall: The North Stream 
 
 One of the ways by which Germany is trying to make up for this comparative 
disadvantage is with the construction of the North Stream pipeline in partnership with Russia and 
the Netherlands. This pipeline, which would stretch under the North Sea from Vyborg, Russia to 
Greifswald, Germany, is intended to meet Europe’s future growing energy demands. The major 
stakeholders are Gazprom with 51% ownership of the project and EON and Wintershall with 
24,5% each8.  
 This 12,000-Kilometer project would start pumping 27.5 billion cubic meters of gas 
yearly to Western Europe by 2010. The former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and 
former Russian President Vladimir Putin (currently Prime Minister) coordinated the project. 
Schroeder, however, caused controversy in Europe because he chaired the consortium while 
acting as Germany’s Chancellor. Furthermore, Europeans had lingering questions of Germany’s 
bilateral negotiations with Russia since other important European governments did not take part 
in the negotiations aside from the Dutch.  
 In other words, Germany’s project goes against the EU Commission’s goal to divert away 
from a gas mono-supplier and the establishment of a multi-vector energy policy. According to 
Kraener, Germany’s move fulfills its self-interests since it would become a hub for Russian gas 
in Western Europe9. Berlin, nonetheless, argues that the pipeline is the beginning of a closer 
                                                            
8 Ibid Kraener (2007): Pp. 126. 
9 Ibid Kraener (2007): Pp. 126. 
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privileged partnership between Moscow and Brussels, since the project would not only benefit 
Germany and the Netherlands, but other EU Members like the Czech Republic.   
In realistic terms, the pipeline does affect other European Union members, notably 
Poland and the Baltic States. This pipeline would explicitly circumvent these countries and 
solidify Western Europe’s dependency on Russia. Since Russia is Europe’s largest energy 
supplier, Brussels is reasonably becoming skeptic. The EU aimed for Nabucco, a pipeline that 
seeks to circumvent Russia by bringing gas supplies from the Caspian Sea through Turkey, 
Romania and Hungary. The North Stream pipeline, however, slashes Brussels’ effort to negotiate 
with new energy producers in Central Asia to weaken the EU’s dependency on Russia. As a 
result, other EU members have questioned Germany’s position.    
  The North Stream pipeline, nonetheless, is very beneficial for both Russia and Germany. 
Russia’s Gazprom, the project’s major stakeholder, is purposely circumventing the Baltic States 
and Poland. Firstly, they would cut costs by avoiding the payment of transit fees. Secondly, they 
would avoid complications due to possible political instability in Eastern Europe10. Thirdly, 
Gazprom would have direct access to Germany, the EU’s largest market, and Russia would 
solidify its foothold in the EU market, which is Gazprom’s most profitable market.  Lastly, the 
bilateral partnership would make this pipeline Russia’s most reliable gas vein11.   
 Germany would also benefit from the Russia’s risk reduction seeking strategy behind the 
North Stream pipeline. Firstly, Germany would make up for some of the ground it lost due to its 
low gas production capabilities in relation to Europe’s major players. Secondly, by becoming a 
                                                            
10 Gazprom (2008): Nord Stream: Risk Reduction. July 05,2008 
<http://www.gazprom.com/eng/articles/article18466.shtml> July 6, 2008 
11 Ibid Gazprom (2008). 
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new energy hub for the EU, Germany would strengthen the competitiveness of its national 
champions EON and Wintershall in Europe.  
 Thirdly, Germany would become one of Russia’s closest trading partners and thereby 
have preferential access to Russia’s juicy energy resources. Finally, Germany would have more 
reliable gas deliveries since it would avoid cut offs due to third party disputes such as the 
Russian-Ukrainian dispute of 2006. The most glaring obstacle for the pipeline’s construction is 
that thousands of bombs lying in the North Sea’s seafloor since World War I could destroy 
machinery and the pipeline’s infrastructure12.  It is also unknown were the bomb traps lie. 
 Nevertheless, these physical challenges will not dampen the strong support this project 
enjoys from Russia’s and Germany’s business and political circles. In addition, it sheds some 
light in the complications of creating a Common European Energy Policy (CEEP). Berlin’s move 
to bypass the Commission’s proposals evidences the difficulties of implementing a solid and 
comprehensive CEEP. Given the lucrative gains from such pipeline and the disadvantaged 
energy trajectory from Germany in relation to Europe’s major players, it is difficult to convince 
Berlin of pulling out of the project. Since Germany lacks the foreign exploration and access oil 
and gas capabilities that other European nations have, Germany sees itself in a deadlock in terms 
of energy policy.  
 Germany, which has the largest population in the EU, depends too much on the market in 
comparison to Spain, France, Italy, Britain and the Netherlands, which have considerably larger 
foreign exploration and access capabilities to meet their nations’ energy demands and smaller 
populations in comparison to Germany. This German weakness makes Berlin thirstier to secure 
                                                            
12 Ibid Kraener (2007): Pp. 126. 
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energy supplies then to follow the Commission’s proposals. Simply put, Germany sees its 
strategic partnership with Russia as a means to secure its continued economic expansion and 
compensate for the shortcomings from its energy companies. Furthermore, the delays from the 
frequent disputes arising between Russia and transit countries like the Ukraine and Belarus make 
this project a win-win for both Russia and Germany.  
 In conclusion, Germany’s temptation to secure its access to Russia’s attractive energy 
reserves evidences how the full implementation of CEEP remains slow because is not beneficial 
to the national energy interests of all the EU Members. Although the Commission recommends 
drifting away from a mono-supplier and building a common energy front, Germany’s deal with 
Russia has solid gains for both members. Russia needs to consolidate its presence in Germany 
because they are Gazprom’s largest customer13. Germany, moreover, sees itself as country 
unable to reject such an offer given the advantages North Stream promises, the market 
complications Germany faces by its small production capabilities of gas and oil, and its 
population size.  
  Finally, Germany is due to its aforementioned weakness, is the only major European 
player that cannot take part in the ‘Uncooperative Strategy’ that others such as Britain, Spain, 
and France can employ14. For Harks and Pointvogl, Germany’s way to secure energy supplies is 
not through the reduction in energy imports, diversification of energy suppliers, sources, routes 
or increasing its energy efficiency, but rather through the function and creation of a liberalized 
                                                            
13 Follath, Eric and Matthias Schepp (2007): Der Konzern des Zaren. [transl. The Company of the Czars]. Der 
Spiegel 10/2007. Pp.122 
14 Ibid Harks and Pointvogl (2007). Pp. 6. 
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market15. Hence, Germany adheres to the EU’s liberalization energy proposals. This is 
exemplified on EON’s incessant attempts to take over Spain’s Endesa and Germany’s move to 
become a new energy distributor by collaborating with Russia’s Gazprom on the North Stream 
project, which makes this a classic case of a country acting to further its self-interests.   
 
3.2 Hungarian Case 
 
  
 In 2007, the occasional meetings of Vladimir Putin and Hungary’s Prime Minister Ferenc 
Gyurcsány leveled the eyebrows of European capitals. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Severin 
Fischer notes that most of the Eastern European governments have had icy relations with 
Russia16. Polish, Czech, and Baltic relations with Moscow, for example, have been frictional. 
Hence, most European capitals were surprised when Gyurcsány and Putin suddenly started 
warming up. This is in part because EU countries that underwent Soviet oppression see Russia 
with a sort of resentment and mistrust. Therefore, the sudden warmth of the Russian-Hungarian 
relationship was the exception that broke the rule.  
 At the core of their new warmth was energy policy. Hungary is an EU member, but its 
pragmatic energy foreign policy is somewhat similar to Germany’s North Stream case. Hungary 
                                                            
15 Ibid Harks and Pointvogl (2007) Pp. 7. 
16  Fisher, Severin (2007): „Verrat an Europa? Ungarns Pragmatische Energieaußenpolitik in Spannungsfeld von 
Diversifierung und Versorgungssicherheit“ [transl. “Trust in Europe? Hungary’s Pragmatic Foreign Energy Politic 
in Tensions with Diversity and Energy Supply.”] Diskussionspapier der Forschungsgrupper EU Integration  [transl. 
Discussion Paper and Investigation of EU Integration]. SWP Berlin [German Institute for International Affairs, 
Berlin]. August 19. <www.swp-berlin.org> Pp. 2. 
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is not a heavyweight like Germany, which places Budapest on the receiving end of the EU. 
Hungary is due to economic and political reasons a less assertive member than Germany inside 
the EU. 
 This did not prevent Hungary, however, from meeting with Russia on an energy project 
that goes against the EU’s intended strategy. By meeting with Putin, Gyurcsány was opening its 
territory to Russia to compete against the EU strategy aiming to divert away from the EU’s 
dependency on Russia. Hungary’s geographical position is extremely important for both 
Brussels’ and Moscow’s energy strategies.  To understand Hungary’s importance, one has to 
delve what is driving both Moscow and Brussels in terms of their energy strategies. 
 
3.2.1 The EU’s Current Problem: Energy Diversification 
 
 Fischer notes that the root of the EU’s problem is that its consumption needs will increase 
from the current 400 billion gas cubic meters per year to 600 billion by 202017. To make up for 
the 200 billion gas cubic meters per year, the EU can count on the North Stream pipeline, which 
will pump 55 billion cubic meters per year. The EU, nonetheless, still ignores how to make up 
for the other 150 billion cubic meters. Some suggest that although Algeria and Lybia are 
important alternatives, their production is still insufficient to meet the EU’s future growing 
consumption, which leaves Russia, with the world’s bulkiest gas reserves, as the EU’s major 
option to alleviate its gas needs at least in the middle-run. 
                                                            
17 Ibid Fischer (2007): Pp. 3. 
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 The EU’s dependence on Russian gas is certainly a challenge for its decision makers. As 
Fischer notes, the EU is searching for alternatives in the Caspian Sea to divert away from 
depending on a mono-supplier as assertive as Russia. As a result, when searching for 
alternatives, the EU is more focused on a country’s logistical acumen then its production 
capabilities.  
 This is specially true for gas producers. Although both gas and oil are indispensible 
commodities for all the EU members with the possible exceptions of France and Denmark, gas 
seems to pose the greatest challenge in terms of transportation18. Oil, for example, can be 
shipped, trucked, and carried by plane. This makes oil in the event of a crisis a relatively easier 
commodity to substitute. Gas, nevertheless, can be transported only through pricy LNG terminals 
(also known as pipelines). Therefore, Fischer concludes that a diversification from oil is, at least 
in the short-term, more feasible than gas. Consequently, Russia’s geographical location and 
existing pipeline network facilities will make it an indispensible partner for the EU at least in the 
short term mainly due to four major factors benefiting Russia.  
 Firstly, Russia has enough gas reserves for approximately 80 years. Secondly, Russia 
already covers 60 percent’s of the EU’s gas needs. Thirdly, the other countries with the world’s 
largest reserves are Iraq and Iran, which due to their unstable political course are not yet reliable 
producers19. Fourthly, as oil reserves dry up, the utilization of gas as an energy supply will 
dramatically increase. These factors in turn give Russia the upper hand vis-à-vis the EU, which 
has propelled Brussels to find alternatives for its gas consumption.   
                                                            
18 Ibid Fischer (2007): Pp.3. 
19 Ibid Fischer (2007): Pp. 4. 
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 3.2.2 The Pipeline Competition: Russia’s Blue Stream vs. EU’s Nabucco 
 
 The EU is developing an alternative runway for new gas supplies that seeks to 
circumvent Russia in a project called the Nabucco pipeline. The largest gas companies from 
Hungary, Romania, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey have joint efforts in Nabucco. This 3,300-
kilometer pipeline would start in Azerbaijan going through Turkey, Romania, Hungary and end 
up in Vienna, Austria20. Planned to be concluded between 2011 and 2013, Nabucco should reach 
its peek capacity by 2017 and financed by the different consortiums from the participating 
countries at a cost of 4.6 billion Euros.  
 Nevertheless, Russia’s gas behemoth Gazprom is vying to win over Budapest to weaken 
Nabucco’s capabilities. Gazprom’s rationale is simple. By extending Blue Stream from the 
Turkish section of the Black Sea to Hungary, Russia significantly hampers Nabucco’s raison 
d’être in Europe and considerably strengthens Gazprom’s control of Eastern Europe’s energy 
market. As aforementioned in the section devoted to Russia, Gazprom’s purpose is to become the 
world’s leading energy company. Therefore, by overpowering the Nabucco pipeline, Russia is 
trying to embed its control of the EU’s gas market21. Moreover, Gazprom has a strong 
                                                            
20 Ibid Fischer (2008): Pp. 4. 
21 Ibid Fischer (2007): Pp. 5. 
 
 
43
comparative advantage over its competitors. It is already the continent’s most important gas 
supplier delivering in 30 European countries22.  
 Fischer also suggests that Hungary benefits more from Blue Stream’s extension then 
from Nabucco. In fact, the benefits are similar to the one Germany attains from North Stream23. 
Firstly, Hungary would become an energy hub for Europe. Secondly, it would shovel up 
considerable earnings by negotiating contracts and fees with third parties24. Thirdly, Blue Stream 
would strengthen Hungary’s gas company MOL. Fourthly, due to the lack of a long-term energy 
storage infrastructure to cover its needs in the event of a crisis, Hungary would benefit from a 
continued flow of gas because Blue Stream’s extension would continuously distribute gas to 
Western Europe25.  
 Currently, Hungary imports 80% of its gas from Russia, which is also a worrisome factor 
for a portion of Hungary’s population. Specifically, Hungary’s conservatives want to reduce its 
dependence from Russia26. They support Nabucco because they estimate it could reduce 
Hungary’s dependency down to 60%. In addition to Hungary’s conservatives, its Eastern 
European neighbors such as Poland vehemently support Nabucco. But Nabucco possesses 
serious logistical shortcomings27.  
                                                            
22 Follath, Eric and Matthias Schep (2007): Der Konzern des Zaren [transl. The Company of the Czars]. Der Spiegel 
10/2007. Pp. 122. 
23 Ibid Fischer (2007): Pp. 7. 
24 Ibid Fischer (2007): Pp. 7. 
25 Ibid Fischer (2007): Pp. 7. 
26 Ibid Fischer (2007): Pp. 7. 
27 Ibid Fischer (2007): Pp. 8. 
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 Nabucco, for example, is not a comforting alternative to the Gyurcsány government 
because it will be finished approximately by 2014. Prime Minister Gyurcsány is interested in a 
project that would bring gas as fast as possible to Hungarian consumers to avoid a gas deficit in 
the coming years. With this goal in mind, Blue Stream appears to be the safest bet for Hungary 
because it will bring in supplies in the short-run28. 
 Furthermore, some of Nabucco’s potential gas producers are uninterested in the project. 
Only Azerbaijan has shown interest, but its gas reserves are insufficient to allow the pipeline to 
start deliveries29. The other Central Asian gas producers like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and 
Turkmenistan are at least in the short-term uninterested in participating in Nabucco because 
Gazprom cunningly consolidated their grip on this market earlier then the Nabucco group did. 
Other potential producers like Iran and Iraq are still in doubt due to their unstable governments30.  
Finally, it is unclear how the five countries participating countries in the project are going to 
finance an already expensive project.  
 Blue Stream, in contrast, is an extension project, which means that is a step ahead in 
logistical infrastructure in comparison to Nabucco. For example, Blue Stream’s extension will be 
entirely financed by Gazprom and depend solely on Russian gas31. Fischer also notes that 
Moscow has strong interests in extending the pipeline because, as evidenced in its North Stream 
project with Germany, they want to circumvent the Ukraine and Belarus. 
                                                            
28 Ibid Fischer (2007): Pp. 8. 
29 Ibid Fischer (2007): Pp. 6. 
30 Ibid Fischer (2007): Pp. 6. 
31 Ibid Fischer (2007): Pp. 6. 
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 In addition to this, Fischer suggests that Hungary might have doubts about embracing 
Nabucco when it comes to its interests as a nation. For instance, Austria’s energy company 
OMV, which heads the Nabucco group, is interested in taking over Hungary’s energy company 
MOL once the pipeline starts delivering. By negotiating with Austria, Fischer believes that 
Hungary can affect its own interests. A possible OMV takeover MOL might send shock waves to 
Budapest that Nabucco might go against Hungary’s energy interests and leave, therefore, few 
enticements for Budapest32.  
 For pragmatists, the Blue Stream extension makes sense because it is a bilateral deal, 
which allows Hungary’s interests to be better represented. Thus, Blue Stream is a kingmaker 
project for Budapest that makes Hungary an energy distributor and allows it to shore up 
negotiation fees and contracts. Not surprisingly, Gyurcsány announced his readiness to continue 
negotiating with the Russians in 2007. Amid this controversy, Brussels’ political circles labeled 
him as a ‘traitor to Europe33.’ Fischer explains, however, that Hungary is only playing its best 
hand. Budapest, Fischer goes on, is in an unpleasant position. Although it is anchored politically 
to Brussels, Hungary depends 80% on Russian gas, which is an extremely high percentage in 
relation even in relation to other Eastern European EU Members34.  
 Gyurcsány started supporting the Nabucco project because of a considerable segment of 
Hungary’s population was starkly against lending their soil Russia’s pipeline. But because for the 
pragmatist Gyurcsány government it was equally important in the short-term to guarantee a 
secure gas supply, he became adamant about rejecting Russia’s offer. Gyurcsány’s social liberal 
                                                            
32 Ibid Fischer (2007): Pp. 8. 
33 Ibid Fischer (2007): Pp. 5. 
34 Ibid Fischer (2007): Pp. 5. 
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ruling party stood for short-term earnings and remained goal oriented. They believed that 
Hungary could not afford an abrupt price increase to its consumers in the future thereby leaving 
Budapest’s doors open to Moscow.  
 In stark contrast to Gyurcsány’s party, Poland and Gyurcsány’s largest opposition party 
FIDESZ staunchly opposed the Russian extension project. FIDESZ, which was also largely 
supported by many of Hungary’s Eastern European neighbors, wanted Hungary to shy away 
from the Kremlin and force the government to create a long-term strategy to reduce the country’s 
dependence on Russian gas35. This strategy enjoys widespread support in Eastern Europe 
because a large portion of Eastern Europeans became Russo-phobian after undergoing Soviet 
control. Fischer also believes that this dispute is not only related to national pride, but also 
evidences the problems of Europe’s energy policy.  
 On one hand, the EU is expecting Hungary to support Nabucco, but does not concretely 
have measures to help the country strengthen its weak gas reserves. In other words, the EU 
expects its members to adhere to its energy proposals, but does not have concrete energy 
solidarity measures to help ailing members confront future crisis despite it is mentioned in the 
reform contract of energy solidarity from Article 19 of the Mandates for Government’s 
Conference36.  On the other hand, most of the Western European governments have enacted a 
slew of laws that go against the Commission’s energy proposals. 
 Therefore, any attempt to forge a CEEP would have to take into consideration the 
Government’s self-interests of each EU member. As seen in the German and Hungarian cases, 
                                                            
35 Ibid Fischer (2007): Pp. 6. 
36 Ibid Fischer (2007): Pp. 2. 
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these nations stepped out of the Commission’s recommendations to look out for their interests 
thus making the creation of a CEEP an arduous process, which implies that the EU should 
rethink its energy strategy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
SECTION 4 
WHY THE EU SHOULD RETHINK ITS ENERGY POLICY 
 
 Even though Europe underwent massive European interstate unification, the continent 
remained dormant in devising a unified strategy that increased the EU’s energy security. As the 
Nabucco example evidences, countries such as Russia have been many steps ahead of Europe in 
the energy game. The fact that Central Asian producers like Kazahkstan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan are giving preferential access to extract their energy to Russia rather then the EU 
members is making analysts like Richard Youngs call for changes in Europe’s energy strategy.     
 Youngs explains that the EU hovers ineffectively between markets and geopolitics. 
Currently, the EU energy strategy is based on spreading eastward and southward exporting the 
EU’s market rules1. The EU operates by expanding its market-governance model. Nonetheless, 
as Youngs and Fischer explain, the EU should rethink the market-governance model for three 
reasons. 
                                                 
1 Youngs, Richard (2007): “Europe’s External Energy Policy: Between Geopolitics and the Market.“ CEPS Working 
Document. No. 278. November 2007, Brussels: Centre For European Studies (CEPS). Pp. 1.  
 Firstly, the Commission proposed that the internal market would set the foundations for 
“a rules-based, market-oriented external policy2.” However, for Youngs there is a group of EU 
members preventing the liberalization of the EU’s energy markets due to one-sided interests 
from some EU members. For example, in 2006 the Commission criticized all governments 
except the Netherlands for not meeting the market-opening commitments they had already 
signed.  
 When Spain hindered Endesa’s takeover, the EU was unable to persuade Madrid to trust 
Germany’s EON. In addition, France has blocked new proposed regulations that would “tighten 
enforcement mechanisms and speed up the implementation of liberalizing reforms3.” These 
examples essentially show how EU governments are only paying ‘lip service support’ to the 
EU’s energy strategy.  
 As Youngs explains, many EU diplomats even feel unconvinced that the EU strategy 
works.  He says that many of them confess that they have to go along with the EU’s pro-market 
rhetoric, but know that the EU’s strategy is ‘unrealistic due to geopolitical complications of 
energy trade’4. If even EU diplomats are not convinced with the European energy strategy, then 
it is very unlikely that the strategy will thrive in the cutthroat-natured markets of Asia, Africa, 
and the Middle East.  
 This leads to a second point. The EU has supported a market-governance strategy that 
remains unattractive to producer countries. Although the EU has of successfully exported 
regulatory norms in many areas such as environment protection and democracy promotion, their 
                                                 
2 Ibid Youngs (2007): Pp. 6. 
3 Ibid Youngs (2007): Pp. 6. 
4 Ibid Youngs (2007): Pp. 7. 
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energy strategies remain insipid to most producer states. As Youngs argues, most producer states 
remain weary of implementing the abstract energy conditionality norms of the EU because they 
habitually adhere to geo-politic realities5.  
 The EU Commission supports an energy policy consistent with the EU’s foreign policy 
goals such as the promotion of human rights, peace support, democratization and conflict 
resolution and prevention6. In addition, they stress the market-governance strategy to ensure that 
the ‘rule of law’ prevails to compete with new energy consumers like China and India. By 
adhering to market-governance, Europeans are trying to “undercut the ability of such rising 
powers to resort to untrammeled political-deal making7.” Moreover, Youngs explains that the 
market-governance also provides a strong framework to attract foreign direct investment for EU 
investors. There are certainly commendable and extremely useful aspects of the EU’s energy 
policy. 
 Producer states, however, are not yet enticed by this strategy. For example, Youngs 
explains how the EU has been unsuccessful in convincing the Gulf Cooperating Council (GCC) 
of the Arabian Peninsula to adopt a free trade agreement with the EU for about 18 years. Gulf 
States, nonetheless, are not comfortable with the EU-Style market and governance norms8. In 
fact, Gulf States criticize EU attempts to export its regional integration model to the region.  
                                                 
5 Ibid Youngs (2007): Pp. 10. 
6 Ibid Youngs (2007): Pp. 11. 
7 Ibid Youngs (2007): Pp. 15. 
8 Ibid Youngs (2007): Pp. 9. 
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 They argue that the EU fails to recognize that the gulf’s intra-dynamics differ even within 
the GCC9. This limits the GCC’s energy cooperation with the EU and results in the bilateral 
decision-making between producers and individual EU countries that always has watered down 
the EU efforts to achieve single-voice negotiations. As a result, Youngs concludes that the EU’s 
common government strategy presents serious shortcomings that should be solved a priory with 
technocracy and pragmatic decision-making10. Simply put, the EU’s strategy should stick to its 
principles, but guided by practical consequences and results. 
 Thirdly, Fischer suggests that the EU strategy needs energy solidarity followed by 
concrete and solid measures. Fischer suggests that the EU’s strategy should be a solid, frank, and 
responsible dialogue with Russia. In realistic terms, Fischer thinks that the EU will depend on 
Russian energy at least until next century11. Thus, Brussels should elaborate a common policy 
towards Russia. 
 Brussels can only win because Russian energy companies and its physical infrastructure 
will be equally dependent on the lucrative European energy market for the coming decades. 
Since Russia is eager to enter the EU retail market (as Gazprom evidenced when it sought to 
takeover Britain’s gas provider Centrica), Europeans should introduce reciprocity clauses in 
exchange for retail and distribution enticements in Russia. On one hand, the EU needs Russia 
since Russia has the largest pipeline networks in Europe and it possesses immense crude 
reserves. Europe, on the other hand, has the best paying market. 
                                                 
9 Ibid Youngs (2007): Pp. 9. 
10 Ibid Youngs (2007): Pp. 15. 
11 Ibid Fischer (2007): Pp. 9. 
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  The Russian-European relationship, however, is still mistrustful despite the large volume 
of trade between them. On one hand, Russians resent the waste and corruption brought by 
privatization of their energy assets during the 1990’s. Europeans, on the other hand, fear that 
Russians can use crude as a political tool and restore to strong-arm tactics once they control the 
distribution and retail. Therefore, the French Presidency’s Reciprocity Clause seems to be a 
feasible and fair solution.  
 Reciprocity would “force companies buying EU energy transmission assets to abide the 
same open market rules that govern EU” businesses12. The clause intends to level the business 
conditions for European operators and would hinder large sell-offs of strategic energy assets 
once the new EU unbundling rules take place13. Since Gazprom has openly expressed interested 
in acquiring assets in Europe, Europeans can give up these assets in exchange for other Russian 
strategic assets where the EU has comparative advantage (such as research and development and 
financial services). By following reciprocity, Europeans would avoid feeling threatened by the 
Russia’s uncertain energy ambitions. 
 Nevertheless, Brussels is still facing skepticism on the part of one member. Germany is 
against reciprocity citing that the clause is endangering its interests; Germany had “secured 
upstream gas and oil gas rights in Russia in return for retail rights14.” Unfortunately, this is 
another example of a feasible EU proposal that would level the field for EU members against 
Russia, but that cannot go through due to the bilateral interests between Russia and single EU 
members. 
                                                 
12 Bryant, Chris (2008) “Germany Opposes Tighter Investment Rules.” Financial Times. October 6, 2008 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b207e500-933e-11dd-98b5-0000779fd18c.html> October 19, 2008. 
13 Ibid Bryant, Chris (2008) “Germany Opposes Tighter.” 
14 Ibid Bryant, Chris (2008) “Germany Opposes Tighter.” 
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  Clearly, Germany is in its right to protect its strategic investments in Russia and other 
foreign countries. Nonetheless, the EU (and for that matter its single member states) cannot 
remain vague and static in its perceptions of Russia. As Gary Marks suggests, there is “clearly no 
EU legislation concerning Russian energy supplies.” The latest conflict in Georgia is a reminder 
of how Brussels should enact energy policies that will prepare the EU in the event of an energy 
cut off.  
 The Russian-Georgian conflict even demonstrates that the EU’s democratization efforts 
in Eastern Europe will remain sluggish if the EU does not achieve energy independence. At the 
time of the conflict, some EU members such as Poland vehemently supported Georgia but others 
such as Germany abstained due to their energy partnerships with Russia. Therefore, Brussels 
should elaborate a strong and definite strategy towards Russia to prevent the Kremlin from 
playing off EU members against each other. The failure to pass the reciprocal clause is just one 
those cases.   
 
4.1 Denmark’s Energy Policy: Achieving Energy Independence  
 
 The most significant strategy the EU can employ to raise its energy security is achieving 
energy independence. Denmark’s energy policy epitomizes the case in point.  After being 
economically crushed by the 1973 oil shocks, Copenhagen devised an energy policy that 
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drastically reduced its dependency on Middle Eastern energy imports from 99% to zero15. By 
imposing itself an array of “gasoline and carbon dioxide taxes and building-and appliance 
efficiency standards,” Denmark sunk its energy consumption and spurred one of the most 
competitive clean power industries in the world, which in turn strengthened its economy and 
placed Danish know-how on the forefront of various industries16.  
 Far from crumbling the economy due to energy prices as high as $10 per gallon, 
Denmark forced itself to innovate. Their bold energy policy strengthened Danish job creation 
and spurred new sources of employment such as wind energy. As a result of such policies, 
Denmark now produces “one-third of the world’s terrestrial wind turbines…[and its] exports of 
energy efficiency products have tripled17.” Thomas Friedman notes that thanks to such policies, 
Denmark has broken its addiction to oil and considerably strengthened its economy. For 
example, Denmark is selling energy efficient technologies at a time when the world is yearning 
for new sources of energy.  
 Although skeptics might suggest that Denmark is small country of only five million 
people and high standards of living, Denmark’s results demonstrate that energy independence is 
possible through smart policies, political will and innovation. Denmark’s Prime Minister Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen even plans to increase taxes on energy to cut personal income taxes and 
improve the country’s energy innovation18. The challenges that larger EU economies (and thus 
                                                 
15 Friedman, Thomas (2008): “Flush With Energy.” The New York Times. August 9, 2008. 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/opinion/10friedman1.html?scp=1&sq=Denmark%20Tom%20Friedman&st=c
se> October 13, 2008.  
16 Ibid Friedman (2008): “Flush With Energy.” 
17 Ibid Friedman (2008): “Flush With Energy.” 
18 Ibid Friedman (2008): “Flush With Energy.” 
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larger consumers) face should make them re-evaluate their current energy strategy since the ones 
in place have not broken their gas and oil dependence. 
 The costs of being large energy consumers on more politically charged producers such as 
Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Russia are too high and risky. In addition, the costs of high-energy prices 
drain the economies of developed countries, as the latest 2007-2008 oil bubble demonstrated. 
Therefore, a possible CEEP might start introducing the Danish idea of smart taxes on energy and 
subsidizing clean energy producing industries. This idea will eventually force countries to 
innovate and make European countries even more environmentally friendly than they are 
already.  
 
4.2 Energy Solidarity: A Possible Basis for a Common Energy Policy 
 
 Denmark has demonstrated that energy independence is possible given the appropriate 
government policies and proper innovation. Another idea to strengthen Europe’s common energy 
policy is Severin Fischer’s idea of an energy solidarity system that looks out for the smaller 
states in Eastern Europe. Since smaller countries are the ones with the starkest energy 
dependence from Russia, a common energy policy should be a tangible and reliable energy 
resource alternative that provides solidarity to them19. 
 Fischer notes that Hungary’s case demonstrates that EU members can walk away from 
the EU consensus if they are threatened by severe energy shortages; Hungary’s gas reserves are 
                                                 
19 Ibid Fischer (2007): Pp. 9. 
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too feeble to confront a crisis. Therefore, Fischer believes energy solidarity is a key aspect that 
the EU should build upon20. Lip service, Fischer says, is not enough to convince countries like 
Hungary to follow the EU consensus when there are no existing concrete measures to aid these 
countries if a crisis hits them. He proposes the creation of a community organ responsible for 
administrating the EU’s energy resources that would look out for the security of the smaller EU 
states and act as a unitary actor to handle the EU’s energy needs.  
 In addition to this, Fischer concludes that the EU should subsidize its transnational gas 
networks and finance inter-pipeline systems to make ‘European energy policy’ a physical reality. 
A system of interconnected energy networks would give way to an energy solidarity system that 
would make the EU a stronger entity that is capable of looking out for its weakest members21. It 
would also give Brussels a stronger voice when dealing with energy producers. One can expect 
that the smaller countries due will unify because they face because the highest pressures in the 
energy market. If the group shows some success, others would be enticed to join. Perhaps therein 
lays an attractive alternative to begin enacting a common energy policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 Ibid Fischer (2007): Pp. 9. 
21 Ibid Fischer (2007): Pp. 8 and 9. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The two most important reasons why the EU lacks a common energy policy are 
Resource Nationalism on the part of influential EU Members and the competitive nature of 
National Champions. Resource nationalism refers to the nationalistic policies that most 
western European countries adopt in regards to their energy assets. Examples of resource 
nationalism include Spain’s refusal in 2006 to sell their energy company Endesa to 
Germany’s EON. Another is France’s move to merge Suez with GDF to impede a takeover 
by Italy’s Enel that same year.  
 Thus, resource nationalism inhibits the necessary fruitful relationship among 
different EU members to liberalize their strategic energy assets. Furthermore, it fosters a 
tendency for governments to pursue energy policy their own way. Take the positions of 
France and Spain. Although Italy’s Enel and Germany’s EON takeover attempts fulfilled 
European trade laws, Spain and France decided to repel the foreign takeovers through State-
sponsored tricks. Specifically, the Spanish government obstructed Endesa’s takeover 
despite repeated calls by the EU Commission for Madrid to approve the merger.  
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 Another aspect that increases resource nationalism is that EU members have 
divergent goals and objectives due to their different geographic locations and energy 
resources. For example, the EU members from the Baltic States want to find new supply 
alternatives since they are entirely dependant on Russian energy supplies. Other members 
such as Poland have called for an Energy NATO among Transatlantic powers to ensure a 
continued energy supply from producers1. Poland’s objective, however, is to create a 
counterweight organization that prevents Russia’s strong-arm tactics such as the cut offs 
they employed against the Ukraine and Belarus.  
   Other EU members such as Germany and Hungary, however, remain more 
comfortable with increasing their energy trade with Russia. A few members such as Spain 
can remain less interested in Russian energy due to their vicinity with northern African 
producers. Similarly, Britain can refuse a Gazprom takeover offer because the bulk of its 
gas imports still come from northern Africa and its own North Sea reserves. Moreover, 
different conceptions prevail within EU members on how to achieve energy security.  For 
instance, coal-starved France has placed a strong emphasis on nuclear energy while 
Germany remains unwilling to implement it. Thus, the creation of a CEEP remains an 
arduous process.  
 Furthermore, the objectives of producer countries can pose obstacles for the creation 
of a CEEP. As the case studies of Russia, Germany and Hungary suggest, the crux of 
European energy policy is that it is in the interest of some individual countries to deal 
bilaterally with Russia and get deals that are more advantageous than if they were dealing 
multilaterally. Russia, for its part, reaps out better deals by dealing bilaterally with 
   
1 Ibid Geden, Goldthau, and Noetzel (2008): “Energie-NATO”... Pp.11 
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European countries. Thus, when the EU tries to shift away from a mono-supplier, Russia 
gives lucrative incentives to geographically or economically advantageous EU members 
such as Germany and Hungary to continue strengthening Europe’s dependency on Russian 
energy. Berlin and Budapest, in turn, accept Russia’s offers because they shore up 
substantial earnings by becoming European energy hubs. 
 The Netherlands, France, Britain, Italy and Spain (Europe’s major players) also 
evidence resource nationalism. As Harks and Pointvogl suggest, these major players are 
vying to protect their respective oil and gas producers by blocking unwanted foreign 
takeovers to safeguard their nation’s energy supply and consequently perpetuate their 
companies’ stronghold abroad. Linked to the major players’ resource nationalism is the 
competitive character of the EU’s National Champions.  
 The EU governments created the National Champions to safeguard their strategic 
energy assets domestically and abroad. Due to the only partial abolishment of existing zone 
monopolies, Kraener explained that National Champions are forced to compete with each 
other in an Offensive-Defensive fashion. On one hand, European National Champions try to 
offensively takeover other assets abroad. They act defensively when they feel that a foreign 
takeover is looming or a foreign company wants to enter their domestic market.  
 Germany’s actions are usually on the offensive (like EON’s bid for Endesa and the 
North Sea pipeline construction) because they are the only major European economy 
without an oil or gas company with significant extraction and access capabilities abroad2. 
Thus, the construction of North Stream tries to make up for Germany’s pitfall by making it 
   
2 Ibid Harks and Pointvogl (2007): Pp. 3. 
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an energy hub3. Germany’s defensive side is its monopoly zone, which remains practically 
impenetrable for non-German companies.  
 For example, Berlin allowed foreign companies such as Sweden’s Vatenfall to 
operate in Germany, but only after Vatenfall made political concessions. Specifically, 
Vatenfall agreed to operate only in Eastern Germany, a region with less solidified 
monopoly zones. Such tactics make it nearly impossible for foreign companies compete 
with EON and RWE in the more lucrative regions of western Germany. Similarly, EDF 
owns practically all of the France’s power supply networks, which successfully repels 
foreign competition.  
 Hungary’s case is similar to Germany’s North Stream example. Hungary is allowing 
the extension of Russia’s Blue Stream pipeline in its territory over the EU-supported 
Nabucco pipeline to become an energy hub. Although Hungary remains an EU member 
strongly anchored in Brussels, its strategic energy partnership with Moscow sheds 
considerable benefits to Budapest. For example, Budapest would shore up substantial 
earnings by negotiating lucrative energy contracts and fees with third parties. In addition, 
the deal would ensure a continued gas flow to a country with weak gas reserves.  
 Russia, for its part, has adopted a hawkish energy policy after finding in crude 
exports a potent foreign policy tool. After the 1990’s left the former Superpowers’ economy 
in shambles, contemporary Russia renewed its strength due to the world’s ever-growing 
energy thirst. Due to its immense energy export revenues and strong domestic consumption, 
Russia has enjoyed at the turn of this century unseen levels of prosperity. Europe, 
   
3 Ibid Harks and Pointvogl (2007): Pp. 3. 
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moreover, has become overly dependent on Russian energy, which has unquestionably 
allowed Moscow to increase its confidence in the international arena. For example, 
Moscow swaggeringly entered Georgia this August in front of a shocked yet submissive 
Brussels.  
 Clearly, high-priced energy exports have been the source of Putin’s swagger. 
Firstly, crude exports have propped up Russia’s economy, which in turn strengthens Putin’s 
popularity in Russia4. Secondly, by renationalizing energy assets and ensuring that the 
energy windfall benefits the Russian State, Putin revamps his image as a leader that fights 
for the interests of the Russian people. Finally, Russian energy serves as a potent foreign 
policy tool with which the Kremlin gains allies and dissipates criticism.  
 For pundits, nevertheless, the toll that the credit crunch recession has taken on 
energy prices will be the first test that the Putin government will endure5. Economists 
suggest that Russia’s growth rates will dive by the end of 2008. Putin’s government 
remains confident that its $531 billion in international reserves will cushion the economy. It 
remains to be seen, however, what will happen to Putin’s popularity and Russia’s economy 
and foreign policy if energy prices continue their downward spiral6. It is quite clear, 
however, that Moscow’s goal is to continue monopolizing Europe’s energy markets. 
   Finally, Russia seems to be steps ahead in the European energy markets. They 
successfully play EU members to against each other. For example, Moscow played 
   
4 White, Gregory (2008): “Oil’s Drag on Russian Growth Poses Test for Putin.” The Wall Street Journal. 
October 18, 2008 <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122428427371546367.html> October 19, 2008. 
5 Ibid White (2008): “Oil’s Drag…” 
6 Ibid White (2008): “Oil’s Drag…” 
 
 
 
 
63
Germany against France on the reciprocity clause and Hungary against Brussels on the 
Nabucco project. Thus, it remains imperative that the EU develops a solid and pragmatic 
policy towards Russia.  
 Some suggest that Brussels should not fear Moscow. They believe that Russia is 
simply too dependent on energy exports to hit Europe on its knees with unprofitable cut 
offs. Russia is certainly dependent on energy exports in order to sustain its economy and 
overhaul its rusty energy infrastructure. Nevertheless, Europeans face larger challenges than 
Russia. In the event of a cut off, the effects on Europe are immediate while for Russia the 
effects would be short or medium term. Thus, it is urgent that Brussels develops a policy to 
deal with Russia. Only this way will Brussels avoid that Moscow shrewdly plays off EU 
countries against each other. If former archenemy European countries were able to unify in 
coal, steel and nuclear capabilities after two devastating wars in less then a quarter century, 
then a common energy policy under an EU flag is not an impossible feat. 
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Figure 1.1 Baku‐Tblisi‐Ceyhan Pipeline. 
Source: British Petroleum  
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 Figure 1.2 North Stream Pipeline 
Source: Gazprom.   
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1.3 Nabucco Pipeline 
Source: Nabucco Pipeline Gas Pipeline International GmbH.  
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